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FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 
VOLUME 1 1993 NUMBER 10 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: 
The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange 
Paul R. McDalliel' alld James R. Repertt" 
Over the past several years, Professors Richard Musgrave and Louis 
Kaplow have engaged in an exchange over the question whether the concept 
of horizontal equity has any independent significance apart from vertical 
equity.] Kaplow answers that question in the negative, Musgrave in the 
affirmative. The purposes of this comment are ( I) to sort out the issues raised 
in the Musgrave-Kaplow exchange, and (2) to set forth a somewhat different 
perspective from which to view those issues. 
I. CONCEPTUAL IsSUES 
A. The Defi1litions 
Kaplow and Musgrave define horizontal equity (HE) as the require-
ment that equals be treated alike. Both define vertical equity (VE) as 
requiring an "appropriate" pattern of differentiation among unequals.2 
B. Synopsis of the Argwnents 
The starting point was a statement by Musgrave in 1959 that the 
requirements of horizontal and vertical equity are but different sides of the 
same coin. Musgrave asked rhetorically "[iJf there is no specified reason for 
discriminating among unequals, how can there be a reason for avoiding 
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
** Associate Professor of Law. Boston College Law School. The authors thank 
Emily Powers. a second year law student at Boston College Law School. for helpful research 
assistance. 
1. Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle. 42 Nal'l 
Tax J. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Kaplow I]; Richard A. Musgrave. Horizontal Equity. Once 
More, 43 Nat'l Tax J. 113 (1990) [hereinafter Musgrave I]; Louis Kaplow. A Note on 
Horizontal Equity, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 191 (1992) [hereinafter Kaplow II]; Richard A. Musgrave. 
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note. I Fla. Tax Rev. 354 (1993) [hereinafter Musgrave II]. 
2. Kaplow I, supra note I. at 140-41; Musgrave I. supra note 1. at 113. 
607 
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discrimination among equals.,,3 His rhetorical question can be rephrased as 
a statement: If we cannot explain why we discriminate among unequals, then 
we cannot explain why we fail to discriminate among equals. Thus, in 1959, 
Musgrave viewed HE and VE as inextricably linked. He explained: 
Without a scheme of vertical equity, the requirement of 
horizontal equity at best becomes a safeguard against 
capricious discrimination-a safeguard which might be 
provided equally well by a requirement that taxes be distrib-
uted at random. To mean more than this, the principle of 
horizontal equity must be seen against the backdrop of an 
explicit view of vertical equity (emphasis added).4 
Musgrave also felt in 1959 that HE and VE, by themselves, were 
inadequate for formulating tax policy because they are dependent upon the 
determination of some measure for distinguishing equals and unequals. He 
stated: "An objective index of equality or inequality is needed to translate 
either principle into a specific tax system."s 
Subsequently, in 1989, Kaplow examined the current use of HE in tax 
policy analysis.6 He concluded, like Musgrave in 1959, that HE is not a 
useful tool because it has no normative content and has no significance apart 
from VE.7 Compliance with VB will always assure compliance with HE, 
Kaplow stated, "because whatever reasons motivate a particular treatment of 
one individual will require the same treatment of another individual who is 
equal in all relevant respects."s 
In response to Kaplow's critique of HE, Musgrave reexamined his 
own 1959 critique of HE.9 He surveyed various formulations of distributive 
justice and concluded that HE has a normative basis of its own that is more 
firmly planted than VB.1O He stated: 
the requirement of HE remains essentially unchanged under 
the various formulations of distributive justice, ranging from 
Lockean entitlement over utilitarianism and fairness solu-
tions. That of VB, on the contrary, undergoes drastic change 
3. Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 160 (1959). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 161. 
6. Kaplow I, supra note 1, at 139-40. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 143. 
9. Musgrave I, supra note 1. 
10. rd. at 117. 
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under the various approaches. While HE is met by the 
various YE outcomes, this does not mean that HE is derived 
from YE. If anything, it suggests that HE is a stronger 
primary rule. I I 
As discussed below, Musgrave argued that it is necessary to compare 
proposed tax changes that differ in their VE and HE outcomes. Where VE 
results are similar, then the change that produces better HE results is to be 
preferred. 12 
But Kaplow then responded: "Musgrave does not attempt to offer an 
example involving HE violation that any relevant distributive theory would 
count as decisive against an otherwise desirable policy."I3 As an example 
of the insignificance of HE, Kaplow stated: 
[A]ssume that the only administratively feasible way to 
redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor involves 
omitting some of the rich from the tax base or excluding 
some of the poor from receiving transfers (perhaps because 
some individuals live in remote areas). Clearly, neither a 
maximum welfare perspective nor a Rawlsian approach 
(derived from a veil construct) would oppose such redistribu-
tion because it violated HE. (They would indicate that the 
distributive objective is satisfied incompletely.)I4 
In a subsequent response, Musgrave agreed with Kaplow that in an 
ideal world, arrangements which satisfy VE also satisfy HE. IS Moreover, in 
the real world, Musgrave stated that it is unreasonable "to limit considerations 
of departure from HE to individuals with identical incomes only, while 
disregarding the relative treatment of individuals with more or less similar 
incomes."I6 Musgrave argued, however, that this did not mean that HE is 
a useless concept since HE and VE concerns must be traded off in assessing 
proposed tax changes in the less than ideal world in which those changes 
must be considered. 17 
11. Id. at 116-17. 
12. Musgrave n, supra note 1, at 356-58. 
13. Kaplow n, supra note 1, at 192. 
14. Id. (footnote omitted). 
15. Musgrave n. supra note 1. at 355. 
16. Id. at 358. 
17. Id. at 359. 
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C. Analysis of the Exchange 
In analyzing the above exchange, it is necessary to return to the HE 
and VB definitions employed both by Musgrave and Kaplow. Recall that HE 
is the requirement that equals be treated alike. One might think that VE, then, 
simply is a requirement that unequals be treated differently. Stated in this 
way, it is clear that neither concept has any nonnative content. The response 
to each definition is "why"? Neither definition, in itself, provides any answer. 
Thus, both Kaplow and Musgrave use a definition of VE which is 
different from the above, i.e., for both it is a requirement that there be an 
"appropriate" pattern or system of differentiating among unequals. The word 
"appropriate" is not self-defining, so where do the two go to provide it with 
content? 
Theoretically, VB could apply to a tax system that is progressive, 
proportional or regressive. Which of these designs is chosen depends upon 
one's underlying theory of justice and decisions about some key economic 
assumptions. 
For example, one can be a thoroughgoing utilitarian and reach any of 
the three tax equity designs noted above. The reason for this is that the 
utilitarian must make a decision about the slope of the marginal utility of 
income. If she thinks that the slope declines, the tax paid will rise with 
income. However, whether the rate schedule should be regressive, proportion-
al or progressive will depend on the rate of decline of the slope (i.e., the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income).18 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the same conclusion about possible 
tax system designs (i.e., progressive, proportional or regressive) is true for a 
believer in distributive justice as articulated by Rawls. For Rawls, the 
demands of justice are met by a society that provides maximum liberty for 
everyone and in which the advantages of the more fortunate promote the 
well-being of the least fortunate. 19 In the context of taxation, Rawls 
concluded that the best tax system for his theory of justice may be a flat tax 
rate on consumption.20 By design, a tax on consumption only exempts 
capital income from tax and capital income is concentrated in the upper 
income levels. Economists commonly argue that, under certain assumptions, 
18. The tax design will be progressive, proportional, or regressive depending on 
whether the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income is, respectively, 
greater than, equal to, or less than one. Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public 
Finance I, Theory and Practice, 200 (1973). Although most economists agree that the slope 
of the marginal utility of income declines, there is far less agreement about its rate of decline 
(its elasticity). 
19. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 60-61, 83 (1971). 
20. Id. at 278-79. 
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such a tax is the equivalent of a tax on wage income only.:!' Given the facts 
that lower income earners have mostly wage income and that they consume 
a higher percentage of total income then do upper income individuals, the 
optimal tax design favored by Rawls is regressive to income (although not to 
consumption). 
With this background, what is the VE to which Kaplow refers? 
Kaplow infuses VE with content by adopting a progressive income tax system 
as the "appropriate" differentiation in the tax treatment of unequals. For 
example, in his analysis of various HE indexes, he suggests that VE favors 
moving individuals closer together.:!:! Similarly, he subsequently states that 
"VE objects to inequality and favors equality.,,23 and that "gains from 
moving individuals closer together are already encompassed in VE."2~ 
Kaplow's appeal to progressivity in defining VE is entirely under-
standable. VE lacks normative content and is derivative, because in order to 
determine what the "appropriate" differential among unequals should be, one 
has to refer to economic assumptions and some theory of distributive 
justice.25 For example, if one believes that the marginal utility of income 
declines in such a manner as to permit the use of a progressive tax rate in 
order to impose equal burdens on taxpayers, then a tax provision based on the 
belief that marginal utility increases is "bad." It is not "bad" because it failed 
to make a distinction among unequals. It is "bad" because one disagrees as 
to whether it is an "appropriate" distinction. In order to determine what is 
"appropriate," one has to refer to additional concepts. Thus, the concept of 
VE, as defined, is itself entirely derivative. 
21. Musgrave, supra note 3, at 262, 266-67. Rawls would usc progressive rates to 
prevent excessive accumulations of weaIlit litat could impair lite libcny of others. Rawls. supra 
note 19, at 279. For some, this concession might consume the rule for lite reasons described 
in the text To make sure litat no one would think he was making use of any of the tools of 
utilitarianism (which he rejects totally), Rawls added: 
It is evident also that the design of the [system of taxation) does not 
presuppose lite utilitarian's standard assumptions about individual 
utilities. . . . The aim of [tax) is not, of course. to maximize lite net 
balance of satisfaction but to establish just background institutions. Doubts 
about the shape of utility functions are irrelevant. 
Id. at 280. 
22. Kaplow I, supra note I, at 143. He states: "Hence. the central defining 
characteristic of HE-and its central force in policy applications-is that it also condemns 
moving individuals closer togeliter in lite income distribution ... directly contrary to VE. .. See 
also id. at 144 (stating litat lite impact of moving t\vo individuals closer together in income 
distribution as a result of a tax reform is measured under VE). 
23. Kaplow I, supra note I, at 147. 
24. Id. at 148. 
25. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and lite Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905. 1910 (l987). 
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With respect to HE, given the economic and justice judgments which 
Kaplow appears to make, he clearly is correct that HE will always merge into 
YE and will not survive as an independent normative criterion. A system 
which seeks to impose equal burdens on all taxpayers should, by definition 
treat equally the subset of taxpayers that have equal income. Similarly, a 
system that seeks to equalize the income of all taxpayers will, of course, treat 
taxpayers with equal income equally.26 
Thus, Kaplow correctly asserts that HE never will prevail to prevent 
enactment of a provision that would otherwise be appropriate on grounds of 
administrative efficiency or YE. As Kaplow has noted, Musgrave has not 
provided any such example and indeed he cannot. The reason Musgrave 
cannot, however, has nothing to do with his defense of HE. The reason is that 
Musgrave has accepted Kaplow's definition of YE and, in that definition, HE 
is subsumed into VE. Thus, neither Musgrave nor anyone else can respond 
to Kaplow's challenge on his terms. Musgrave properly, in our view, 
subsequently pointed this out by observing that Kaplow is correct only "if the 
relevant norm is defined in [prescribed] YE terms.'>27 
Even where the "appropriate" form of differentiation among unequals 
for VE purposes does not involve a progressive rate structure, HE will lack 
normative content.28 In order to determine whether equals are treated 
equally, the measure of equality has to be defined, i.e., in tax terms the tax 
base must be determined. Once that definition is properly articulated, it 
necessarily follows they will be treated alike. In a different, but relevant, area 
of the law, Professor Westen stated: 
The formula "people who are alike should be treated alike" 
involves two components: (I) (sic) a determination that two 
people are alike; and (2) a moral judgment that they ought to 
be treated alike. The determinative component is the first. 
Once one determines that two people are alike for purposes 
of the equality principle, one knows how they ought to be 
treated.29 
26. Musgrave II, supra note 1, at 358. 
27. Id. at 356. 
28. There has been a debate over whether equality has any normative content in the 
context of the administration of justice. That discussion is relevant to our analysis. See, e.g., 
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983); Anthony 
D' Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 600 (1983); Kenneth 
L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As 
a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 387 (1985). 
29. Westen, supra note 28, at 543. 
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The fIrst component is satisfIed in the context of taxation by a 
selection and definition of a tax base. Thus, with respect to HE, once one has 
decided on the tax base (say, income), then all that is required is a definition 
of income.30 However, once income is defIned, those with equal amounts of 
income will, by defInition, be taxed equally. If a particular item which 
constitutes "income" is not taxed or a consumption cost is allowed to be 
deducted, we know that the provision is "bad" and applying HE adds nothing 
to that analysis. 
Musgrave resorts to external resources to support his assertion of the 
independence of HE. For example, he refers to the fact that it reflects "a basic 
premise of social mores,,31 and is "almost universally accepted."n And, in 
his assertion that it is necessary to conceive of a "meta principle" by which 
trade-offs between VE and HE may be weighed in assessing a particular tax 
revision, he relies on "the public's sense of equity."l3 We do not imply that 
Musgrave is inappropriately calling on these principles to justify HE. We 
only point out that in this process, he is doing exactly what both he and 
Kaplow do in asserting a normative content for VE. 
In summary, we believe that Musgrave/Kaplow exchange reveals the 
following: (1) Musgrave in 1959 demonstrated that there is no independent 
content to VE and resort must be had to economic assumptions and a theory 
of justice to provide that content; (2) we read Kaplow as agreeing with that 
view and he, in fact, does infuse VE with just such content; and (3) given 
Kaplow's now content-infused VE, he has demonstrated (and Musgrave 
agrees in an ideal world) that HE is subsumed within it and has no indepen-
dent normative content 
For us, however, both HE and VE at best become surrogates to 
describe consistency with or departures from the underlying decisions about 
the tax base and rate structure. The question is whether they are useful 
surrogates or whether they confuse or obscure the real issues that should be 
addressed in assessing proposed or actual changes in tax structure. We 
address those issues in li, below. But first we turn to the indexes of HE 
discussed by Kaplow and Musgrave. 
30. Musgrave, supra note 3, at 161. 
31. Musgrave II, supra note I, at 355. 
32. Id. at 356. 
33. Id. at 358. 
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ll. MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
A. The Kaplow/Musgrave Exchange 
If one agrees with our conceptual analysis, it follows that any attempt 
to develop an index to measure the extent to which a tax change violates HE 
or VB is futile. However, economists, including Musgrave,34 have sought to 
develop such indexes. 
Kaplow asserts that the inadequacies of HE as an independent 
normative concept become apparent when one seeks to measure it. He states 
that two major problems exist. First, unless HE is viewed as an absolute 
constraint, it is necessary to assign some measure of the degree to which it 
is violated.35 Second, since by definition HE applies only to equals, it does 
not address individuals whose positions initially differ.36 Thus, Kaplow 
observes, that "even an infinitesimal difference in treatment beyond whatever 
range is deemed 'equal treatment' counts as a violation, while further 
deviations, no matter how significant, are ignored.'>37 
Kaplow analyzes the efforts of investigators who have sought to deal 
with these problems by measuring changes in HE. He states that several 
economists have sought to measure the HE impact of a tax law change by 
comparing the pre-change ranking of taxpayers to the post-change ranking of 
taxpayers.38 If the rankings change, HE is said to be violated.39 For exam-
ple, assume that prior to a tax law change the ranking of individual40 
taxpayers A, B, and C, based on after-tax income is: 
34. See Musgrave I, supra note 1, at 117-20; Musgrave II, supra note 1, at 357-58. 
35. Kaplow I, supra note 1, at 140. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 140-41. 
38. The rankings are based on measures of economic well-being. See, e.g., Robert 
Plotnick, A Comparison of Measures of Horizontal Equity, in Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, 
and Economic Well-Being 239, 246-47 (Martin H. David & Smeeding Timoth eds., 1985). 
Economists have suggested or actually employed various definitions of income or utility in 
ranking the economic well-being of taxpayers. See, e.g., A.B. Atkinson, Horizontal Equity and 
the Distribution of the Tax Burden, in The Economics of Taxation 3-19 (Henry J. Aaron & 
Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. Pub. 
Econ. 77 (1976); Mervyn A. King, An Index of Inequality: With Applications to Horizontal 
Equity and Social Mobility, 51 Econometrica 99 (1983); Harvey S. Rosen, An Approach to 
the Study of Income, Utility, and Horizontal Equity, 92 Q. J. Econ. 307 (1978). 
39. See Kaplow I, supra note 1, at 141, 146-48. See also King, supra note 38 at 99-
115; Robert Plotnick, The Concept and Measurement of Horizontal Equity, 17 J. Pub. Econ. 
373,373-91 (1982). 
40. Usually, individual taxpayers are not ranked but rather groups of similar 
taxpayers are ranked. This example uses individuals for illustrative purposes. 






























HE is deemed violated by the change because B and A have changed ranks. 
Kaplow argues that the ranking studies suffer from essentially the 
same defects as the concept of HE itself because a small change in income 
(A's income dropped only by 2 in the above example) as a result of a tax law 
change may result in a rank change while a large change in income might 
result in no rank change.41 This is illustrated by the following example. 
Consider again taxpayers who have the following after-tax income 













As discussed above, if A's after-tax income were to decrease by 2 to 98 as 
the result of a tax law change, while the income of B and C remain the same, 
the ranking studies would show a violation of HE because A and B have 
switched ranks. 
Contrast this result with the consequences where the tax change 
causes A's income to increase to 147, B's income to decrease from 99 to 51, 
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Note that the rankings have not changed and, therefore, that no change in HE 
would be registered by the ranking analysis although the disparity between 
A's and B's income has increased markedly. Also note that Kaplow correctly 
states that the indexes are not measuring the treatment of equals (HE), but 
really are measuring the treatment of unequals (VE) since the ranking process 
begins with individuals (or groups) with different incomes.42 
Lastly, Kaplow asks why the ranking of taxpayers prior to the tax law 
change is the starting point for this form of HE analysis.43 The use of 
changes in the ranking of taxpayers to measure the impact of a tax law 
change on HE must in effect assume that the pre-change ranking achieved 
HE. Yet, Kaplow observes, the pre-change ranking is itself the result of 
several prior tax law changes that mayor may not have achieved HE.44 
Musgrave also proposes an index that seeks to measure HE. Rather 
than using a ranking system such as that described above, Musgrave devised 
an index with two parts. The first part, the HE component, would measure 
the difference between the welfare cost of the tax system if equals were 
treated equally and the welfare cost of the system when equals are not treated 
equally.45 The second component, the VE component, would measure the 
difference between the welfare costs of the tax system assuming that VE had 
been achieved and the welfare costs of the tax system where VE is not 
achieved.46 Musgrave uses the term welfare costs to represent the burden 
imposed on all taxpayers by the tax system. In his examples, he calculates 
welfare cost by assuming that the marginal utility of income declines as 
income increases.47 He argues that his system of employing two components 
to isolate the welfare costs arising from the failure to achieve HE or VE is 
superior to ranking studies because his system measures changes in the 
allocation of tax burdens that might be considered significant but that might 
not result in a rank shift.48 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 146-47. 
44. Id. Kaplow notes that some authors have attempted to deal with this problem 
by determining what the distribution of income would be if the ideal tax system were in effect 
and then comparing the effect of the tax reform on the distribution of income to the ideal 
distribution. Id. at 147-48. However, Kaplow argues that the distribution analysis is really 
focusing on VB since it is analyzing the impact on unequals. 
45. Musgrave I, supra note 1, at 117-18; Musgrave II, supra note 1, at 357-58. 
46. Musgrave I, supra note 1, at 117-18; For this purpose, Musgrave assumes that 
VB has been achieved with a tax distribution that minimizes aggregate welfare costs. 
47. Musgrave assumes a social welfare function that assigns a value of 10 to the 
first dollar of income, of 9.1 to the second dollar of income, of 8.19 to the third dollar of 
income, etc., with the social welfare of each successive dollar of income declining by 10%. 
Musgrave I, supra note 1, at 119. 
48. Id. at 118. 
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A simple version of Musgrave's index will illustrate Musgrave's 
thesis. Consider four individuals Ll, L2, HI. and H2. Ll and L2 have low 
incomes, each receiving $5, and are grouped together in the low rank 
category L. HI and H2 have high incomes, each receiving $10, and are 
grouped together in the high rank category H. Two proposals to implement 
an income tax for the first time ever are being considered. The impact of the 
two proposals on the after-tax income and rankings of the individuals is 
illustrated below. 
First Tax ProQosal Second Tax ProQosal 
Initial Initial Net Group Net Group 
Income GrouQ Rank Tax Income Rank Tax Income Rank 
HI 10 1 4 6 I 2.5 7.5 1 
H2 10 1 4 6 1 3.8 6.2 1 
Ll 5 2 0 5 2 .4 4.6 2 
L2 5 2 0 5 2 1.3 3.7 2 
Note that although the two tax proposals have a disparate impact on 
the members of the two groups, L and H, the reforms do not register a rank 
change so long as only two ranking groups are used because HI and H2 still 
have after-tax incomes that place them in the highest ranking group and Ll 
and L2 still have incomes that place them in the lowest group. Thus, using 
the ranking analysis, each proposal is consistent with HE although after-tax 
incomes differ markedly depending upon which proposal is adopted. 
Musgrave's index attempts to capture the HE movement which the 
ranking studies miss. In addition, Musgrave's index attempts to measure VE 
differences. Thus, under Musgrave's approach, the two systems would register 






VE Welfare costs 
as result of not 
achieving VE 
















49. This example is obtained from Musgrave n. supra note 1. at 357. 
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HE welfare costs 
as result of not 
achieving HE 




Note that the fIrst tax proposal has no excess welfare cost under Musgrave's 
approach, 50 but the second tax reform registers both excess HE and VE 
costs.51 Thus, the fIrst tax proposal would be preferable. 
Kaplow criticizes Musgrave's two-component index because it 
devotes one entire component (the HE component) to the few persons who 
just happen to be equal while all other persons are lumped together in the VE 
component. In terms of the above example, if LI and L2 had not started with 
identical incomes of 5 but had instead had initial incomes of 5 and 4.9, and 
HI and H2 had not started with initial incomes of 10 each, but had initial 
incomes of 10 and 9.9, no HE measure would be applied to the treatment of 
HI, H2, LI, and L2. Instead, the treatment of HI, H2, LI, and L2 would be 
measured solely by the VE index. Kaplow asks why a separate index, the HE 
index, should be devoted solely to the measurement of the impact of 
individuals who start out as equals when all other taxpayers are lumped into 
the VE index.52 Moreover, Kaplow asks what weight should be assigned to 
VE and HE costs. For example, if one proposed tax law change results in an 
excess VE cost of 6 and HE cost of 0 while the other result in an excess VE 
cost of 3 and HE cost of 3, both will have the same aggregate welfare cost 
of 6. Kaplow queries which tax proposal should be selected. He asserts that 
since both HE and VE derive from the same normative base,53 it is diffIcult 
to see why they should have a different normative import. 
In a subsequent article, Musgrave admits that in a complex world it 
is unrealistic "to limit considerations of departure from HE to individuals 
with identical incomes only, while disregarding the relative treatment of 
individuals with more or less similar incomes.,,54 But he maintains that this 
does not mean that HE is a useless independent concept. 
B. Analysis 
In our view, Kaplow's analysis of the defects of ranking studies to 
analyze HE is correct. As noted above, to the extent that ranking studies use 
50. That is, equals are treated equally, and there is an "appropriate" differentiation 
between Hand L. 
51. That is, equals are not treated equally, and there is not an "appropriate" 
distinction in the treatment of unequals. 
52. Kaplow II, supra note 1, at 195. 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7. 
54. Musgrave II, supra note 1, at 358. 
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the distribution of income existing prior to a tax law change as a base to 
measure the HE impact of the change, the studies are in effect assuming that 
the pre-change distribution achieved HE, an assumption that appears to be 
extremely weak. Moreover, because in the real world the ranking studies 
compare the impact of the change on taxpayers or groups of taxpayers who 
start with different incomes, Kaplow is correct in asserting that ranking 
studies really involve a VE analysis. 
We also believe that Musgrave's effort to defend the vitality of his 
indexes for measuring HE and VE ultimately must fail. We believe that his 
concession quoted above that the HE component cannot be limited to 
taxpayers with identical incomes is in fact a reversion to his 1959 assertion 
that HE folds into VE once a system that makes appropriate distinctions 
among unequals is adopted. Moreover, the VE component gives no 
information in addition to the economic assumption made by Musgrave that 
the marginal utility of income declines. Finally, it follows that the index will 
not assist in identifying relevant trade-offs in assessing proposed tax changes 
because VE and HE both are derivative concepts. Because HE and VE derive 
their normative base from economic judgments, values based on some theory 
of justice and efficiency concerns, the relevant trade-off is between or among 
those potentially conflicting fundamental judgments and values. 
If it is agreed that objective indexes of HE and VE are not likely to 
be developed, the question remains as to whether HE and VE concepts may 
have some utility in the real world. 
ill. HE AND VE AS SURROGATES FOR BASIC ECONOJlrllC 
AND JUSTICE DECISIONS 
A. Kaplow's Suggestions 
Although Kaplow rejects both the proposition that HE contains any 
normative content and the Validity of indexes of measures of HE, he 
nonetheless concludes his 1989 article by suggesting some practical, if 
limited, uses for which HE may be employed. Two of those uses are: 
(1) HE analysis may reveal provisions (or the absence thereon that 
are the source of inefficiencies or which need adjustment in order that VE 
norms may be applied properly.55 
55. Kaplow I, supra note 1, at 149. 
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(2) Repeated violations of HE could have adverse effects on 
(presumably labor and investment) incentives and undesirably impose the 
element of risk. 56 
B. Analysis 
Kaplow concludes that none of these uses demonstrates any 
normative content to HE (and, we would add, the same is true for VE). 
Instead, according to Kaplow, they serve as signals that something is amiss 
that needs investigation. The question is whether attention to HE in the above 
situations (and others he describes) adds anything to the analytical process. 
To take Kaplow's fIrst example, would application of HE analysis 
have added anything to the analysis of the need for the time value of money 
rules enacted in 1984? Indeed, the more troubling question is whether a focus 
on HE concerns would have masked the source of the problems and hence 
the need for the changes. That is, were not principles of income defInition 
and allocation of income and expenses to proper accounting periods suffIcient 
to indicate the need for changes?57 After applying the principles, what 
further could HE analysis have provided that would have led to any different 
conclusions about the appropriate legislative responses? 
In the case of Kaplow's second example, if legislative changes 
impose undesirable elements of risk, it is the identifIcation of the undesirable 
risk effects (undesirability measured in terms of risk, not HE) that will be 
determinative. HE adds nothing to the analysis and waiting for HE analysis 
to reveal the risk effects may postpone identifIcation of problems that would 
have been revealed if risk analysis were used to begin with. 
Similar lines of analysis lead to the conclusion that Kaplow's other 
suggested uses of HE are better served by an examination of the fundamental 
concerns that underlie each problem. 
Because Musgrave sees a broader role for HE than the practical uses 
suggested by Kaplow, he presumably does not object to these lesser 
suggestions. We suggest, however, that the questions raised as to the more 
limited uses require further exploration. In the end, we believe, any use of HE 
is going to be driven by more fundamental concerns. The question for 
advocates of even limited use of HE is why should analysis not begin and 
end in terms of those more fundamental concerns. The risk is that relying on 
HE or VE analysis might lead policymakers and the public astray if those 
56. Id. 
57. In 1959, Musgrave observed that once the appropriate income definition is 
agreed upon, most of the HE concerns have been resolved. Musgrave, supra note 3, at 161. 
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concepts in fact do not accurately or adequately reflect underlying principles 
in a given situation. 58 
C. The Effect of Tax Expenditure Analysis on HE alld VE 
Even if one believes that HE and VE analyses do or should have a 
role to play, it is important to keep in mind the kind of provision being 
assessed. If the provision is a tax expenditure, HE and VE notions should not 
play a role in assessing a change. As McDaniel demonstrated in an earlier 
article,59 the introduction or removal of a tax expenditure has no impact on 
tax equity, whether HE or VE. This counter-intuitive result flows from the tax 
expenditure construct itself: a taxpayer is deemed to pay tax based on 
economic income and is then given a Treasury check in an amount equal to 
the subsidies run through the tax system for which he or she qualifies. 
Obviously, in the real world two checks are not exchanged. Instead, the 
taxpayer nets his or her "economic tax check" amount with the "tax subsidy" 
check amount and remits the difference (or gets a refund). But focusing on 
the economic tax check portion of the analysis reveals that a tax expenditure 
is not the object of traditional tax HE or VE concerns. Indeed, if those 
concerns are applied to tax expenditures (as frequently they are), policy-
makers can be ied astray (e.g., "no new taxes" as a call to oppose repeal of 
a tax expenditure). Of course, there are equity concerns to address in 
assessing tax expenditures. But those concerns are those that are involved in 
assessing the outlay side of the budget (which mayor may not be identical 
to tax notions of HE and VE). 
Use of tax expenditure analysis also is consistent with our criticisms 
of HE and YE. That is, tax expenditure analysis avoids HE and VE altogether 
and focuses directly on the issues of why, for example, an item of income is 
untaxed and what the economic and distributional effects of that omission are. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The KaplowlMusgrave exchange has raised issues of considemble 
theoretical and practical interest. Our analysis of this exchange leads us to the 
following conclusions: (1) neither HE nor VE has any independent normative 
content, and that content must be supplied by reference to economic 
assumptions and a theory of justice; (2) Kaplow has demonstrated convinc-
ingly the inadequacies of efforts to develop indexes that will measure 
58. See Westen, supra note 28 (making a similar point in his broader analYSIS of 
equality). 
59. Paul R. McDaniel, Identification of the 'Ta,," in "Effective Ta" Rates," "Ta" 
Reform" and "Tax Equity," 38 Nat'l Tax J. 273, 277 (1985). 
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movements in HE as a result of tax law changes; and (3) it is not likely that 
HE and VE add anything to the need to analyze tax changes in terms of basic 
tax policy objectives and indeed may conceal problems or lead policy makers 
astray as particular tax changes are considered. 
